Japanese experience Japanese experience Japanese experience Japanese experience in in in in late 80s late 80s late 80s late 80s ----the problem not the problem not the problem not the problem not solved. solved. solved. solved.
For reasons beyond the scope of this paper from about 1986 onwards, banks increased credit creation aggressively. Meanwhile, the ability of the economy to service these loans -national income -only grew about half as fast. It was classic case of unproductive excess credit creation: money was produced by the banking system but not used productively. Instead, it was used for speculation or consumption. Bank loans can be called the borrowing of the nation. The ability to service loans depends on income generation. That is GDP growth. The visible problem was the in the late 1980s, Japanese bank loans grew double digits, while nominal GDP rose by no more than 6%. In 1989, banks suddenly restricted loan growth. During the course of 90s, BoJ did not create credit in the economy, intensifying deflation pressure 4 . BoJ engaged in quantitative easing (QE) in 2001. Success of these operations has been limited.
Understanding c Understanding c Understanding c
Understanding credit and its role in redit and its role in redit and its role in redit and its role in economic economic economic economic growth growth growth growth Central bank does not target amount of credit (money) in the economy, it targets short term interest rate (bank reserves) to run monetary policy today 5 . By having too much excess reserves (which central bank can create via open market operations), banks can expand credit (deposits) in the economy and make profit on the difference between cost of liabilities and 1 Before 1998, responsible for monetary policy conduct in Japan.
2 Werner (2003) 3 BoJ controlled the amount of credit that the economy would recieve. 4 The reason as in Werner (2003) is that BoJ wanted structural change in the economy and simply granting credit would have not achieved this. Therefore, no credit was granted. 5 Many countries that introduced monetary targeting failed. The Bank of England went through a number of monetary targets without success. It finally abolished the procedure entirely in the mid-1980s. The bank of Japan was more successful, it met monetary targets with the utmost precision. By precisely controlling credit creation through its window guidance it could also achieve any targeted goal for deposit measures, such as M2+CD. Fed and Bank of England did not have window guidance. The reason for abandoning targets for money growth and instead setting interest rates as a way of making monetary policy comes from 1970s when prior stable relationship between money growth and either inflation or nominal income growth no longer existed (more in Friedman, Kutter (2010)).
return on assets. Differently put, commercial banks are important vehicle in credit creation 6 . However, the ability of banks to create credit does not necessarily mean that credit will be created.
Credit can be either used for transactions that are within GDP accounting and within non-GDP accounting, such as all asset (real estate) and financial transactions. Thus during the last several decades we have observed increased amount of credit that has been used in financial and real estate transactions and therefore traditional quantity equation has recorded a decline in velocity (say M2, M3 velocity) since raising part of the money supply was used for non-GDP transactions. In sum, the accurate representation of money supply in a large non-cash based economy is credit creation 7 . It is important to distinguish between productive credit creation, which is used for the creation of new goods and services, and which is non-inflationary, and unproductive credit creation, which leads to one of two types of inflation. Unproductive credit creation can take the form of "consumptive credit", which is the extension of credit for the consumption (but not creation) of goods and services -consumer price inflation (which hasn't been observed due to emerging markets and China integration in the world economy with vast productive capacity and labor force). Unproductive credit creation can also take the form of non-GDP credit, which is credit created for the use in asset or financial transactions (observed in the USA, elsewhere). Excessive (>GDP growth rates) unproductive credit creation is unsustainable in the medium to long run 8 . When banks are exposed to unproductive credit, they are exposed to asset price fluctuations. Consequently, if prices fall (when borrowing (credit) raises quicker than income (GNDI which is equal to GDP) is growing, at one stage the borrower will not be able to pay back/refinance all those loans) and as bank assets shrink, they can no longer expand credit to productive sector (and neither to unproductive) -this is Fisher's debt deflation theory.
What Japan did in 70s via window guidance is it literally forced banks to lend, and since external demand existed (Japan was major exporter to EOCD 9 ), recovery followed. Central banks today do not target amount of credit. Central banks target short term interest rates and bank reserves. Bank reserves, being part of high powered money today have skyrocketed (Chart 2). This gives banks an ability (but does not obligate) to increase credit in the economy. Banks prefer to recycle these reserves back to the Fed (excess reserves) or purchase government bonds. Banks do not create credit in the economy. At every level of interest rate there is demand for credit and as interest rate approaches 0, demand for credit raises. It is up to the bank to make the decision on whether to grant credit or not. When bank assets are impaired (from credit to unproductive economy), credit supplied for productive use is constrained.
The monetarist prescription to increase high-powered money (and their subset, bank reserves) has so far failed. It has failed in Japan in the 1990s, 2001 to boost the economy. As long as banks are burdened with asset prices significantly below par (or deflated, unmarketable, level 3 assets without market valuation), they will not want to increase credit and money multiplier will not work. The Kaynesian and post-Keynesian prescription of fiscal expansion has failed to boost Japanese economy -Werner (2004) showed that when government spending is financed not by monetization (thus increasing money supply, credit) but by bond issue, no new purchasing power is created but money is redistributed from private sector to the government, leaving GDP unchanged (in Y=C+I+G+NX). From regression analysis, Werner (2004) showed that for every yen in government spending that is not monetized, private demand shrinks by 0.957 yen (approx 1 yen) 10 . Borrowing from abroad will not necessarily diminish purchasing power in the economy (if central bank does not sterilize increase in money supply). However, FX borrowing ceiling should be lower than local currency ceiling since foreign currency cannot be printed.
Interest rate channel does not work when interest rates approach 0 (fed funds at 0-0.25%, liquidity trap). Since BoJ bought only high quality paper and disregarded problematic assets, attempt to boost credit has been ineffective. QE in the US is more efficient since the Fed took on its balance sheet not only US sovereign obligations, but also unmarketable MBS. Nonetheless, the amount of expansion in credit and the amount that the Fed can take on the balance sheet is not comparable (shadow banking system liabilities of about USD 20 Trill. at high in 2007). If the Fed had taken all impaired assets on the balance sheet and paid for them at par, dollar sustainability would be questioned. Therefore even correct in its approach, the magnitude of the problem is too great to be solved via such a swap operations (cash of bad assets on bank's balance sheet). Monetization procedures of such a magnitude can lead to severe negative consequences for dollar's reserve status which plays major role in USA economic growth (borrow cheap from the world and lend with a margin strategy).
As highlighted above, BoJ has engaged in window guidance in 1970s. This is not an option for the Fed today, as it has no legal power to obey banks to lend. What is there in the arsenal to fight deflationary pressure?
10 Kumar and Woo (2010) showed that based on a range of econometric techniques, there is an inverse relationship between initial public debt and subsequent growth, controlling for other determinants of growth: on average, a 10 percentage point increase in the initial debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with a slowdown in annual real per capita GDP growth of around 0.2 percentage points per year, with the impact being smaller (around 0.15) in advanced economies.
1. Productive demand for credit comes from economic prosperity or technological progress or when the economy moves upper on the value added chain. If there is an ability to improve efficiency, then demand from companies would raise demand for credit, and since used productively, would not result in bank inflation. This theoretical picture does not in any case suggest what monetary authorities should do as there still has to be source of demand for this value added production. Demand is what is needed for the recovery. Demand in previous years came from the fact that with appreciating real estate and (of lesser importance) stock markets -which has been based on deregulation and consequent credit creation, consumers were able to withdraw equity from these assets and spend it. Differently put, demand was driven from appreciating assets. In order to remain on the same path of growth, not only it is necessary to get values of assets to previous highs, but also to keep the same slope of growth. How likely is that in the current state of event? Not very likely. At first, the Fed would have to make up for the gap between market price of impaired assets and the par value. This is not consistent with its objective to keep inflation low. As discussed, intervention of such an immense size increases probability of dumping the dollar as reserve currency (and therefore raising inflation). For these reasons, validity of conclusions from analysis of projections for consequent credit growth based on statistical analysis of data between 1970 -2007 should be questioned 11 .
2. Demand from emerging markets (China, India, etc…) -as shown in Kadish (2010) 12 , there is no private demand in these countries due to financial underdevelopment and economic structure. Consumers are not able to withdraw equity from appreciating assets (if assets are appreciating) and spend it (not even saying that there is no desire to spend). It seems that claim of change in the paradigm and superiority of new emerging market consumer is simply not supported by any plausible argument, empirical research or statistical analysis 13 .
M M M Major credit indicat ajor credit indicat ajor credit indicat ajor credit indicators ors ors ors
Credit in the broad term is what matters for asset prices. Asset prices and development of financial system is what mattered for growth during the last decade. Even though we follow bank assets as the quickest way to proxy credit creation (banks publish quarterly reports quicker than FFA 14 ), liability analysis (from FFA) of traditional and shadow banking system gives most comprehensive analysis of interrelations between asset prices (from accounting point of view, they are the same). Chart 4 shows that even thought bank assets continued to raise after NASDAQ bust, stock markets remained flat to negative for the next several years. Since bank assets created credit in the economy, eventually stock markets turned and followed the credit creation trend. The ultimate question is: is there a reflexive relationship between bank credit and stock market valuation which reflect expectations of future earnings. Intuition suggests that this is not stable relationship and hardly subject to any "written rule". Expectations might push prices up which might reinforce confidence in further growth and result in self reinforcing expansionary process. However, if expectations are not supported by fundamentals, eventually reverse self-reinforcing process will be engaged. Consistency between expectations (stock market) and actual credit creation (bank assets) is what inevitably experiences stable relationship in the long run. Appendix I discusses credit monitoring approach in the economy.
Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion
Excessive (>nominal GDP growth) unproductive credit creation (as in Japan in 70s, 80s) leads to subsequent crisis and deleveraging periods. Japan has forced banks to lend in the 70s. Since credit was used productively, this has resulted in economic recovery (Japan was major exporter to OECD 15 ). In 90s, window guidance has been cancelled and banks being burdened with bad assets stopped lending. As credit constraint seems to be primary source of problem for productive economy, deflation followed. Neither Fed, nor ECB can force banks to lend. In order to achieve this task, large quantity of unmarketable assets have to be removed from commercial banks' balance sheets to the central bank balance sheet -this can result in abandonment of USD, EUR as reserve currencies. Government support is constrained for 2 reasons: Japan experience shows that local borrowing, if not monetized, simply redistributes demand from private sector to public, not affecting GDP in the long run. Borrowing in foreign currency is constrained by definition as foreign currency cannot be printed. It is subject to rollover risk and sudden hike in the cost of borrowing. The most important economic statistics to follow is credit creation in the economy via various proxies. Without credit, recovery is not possible by definition due to tight relationship between credit and nominal GDP growth. The quickest proxy that indicates whether credit is growing is bank asset quarterly reporting (aggregate for large number of banks). Results for Q2 do not indicate any improvement neither for the US, nor for Europe. Consequently, the best assets to have during the period of deflation are: long long term treasury bonds, short precious metals.
In Appendix II we show that analysis of M2 as a proxy for credit in the economy is meaningless both for developed countries (with securitization market) and emerging economies (where credit is taken in foreign currency from banks that are effectively foreign banks' subsidiaries. M3 for Europe is somewhat more meaningful than M3 in the USA due to lower level of securitization market development. We speculate that in any case, analysis of Bank Assets (commercial and shadow where existent) is the quickest way of analysis of credit developments in the economy. Even thought M2 monetary aggregate for the USA remained flat (data not presented), it gives no valuable information on economy growth whatsoever. Since securitization market has evolved significantly, this aggregate is simply too narrow to represent the overall economy. Shadow and commercial bank liabilities are better proxies for state of the economy. As evident form regression results in Table 2 , total bank liabilities (commercial +shadow, i.e. BANK) is a better proxy for the US to track credit developments in the economy than M3 monetary aggregate. Dow Jones Industrial Index is not significantly related to credit developments during the sample period. Stock markets seem to experience long term deviations from credit developments in the economy. Housing is strongly related to credit developments (credit leads housing price growth, regression results not presented here). Table 2  Table 2  Table 2  Table 2 Results for EU indicate relationship between real estate prices, housing prices the stock market and M3 monetary aggregate (Table 3) . M3 in EU is more correlated with the economy than in the US. It is not surprising, considering that securitization market is less developed in EU and economy is more reliant on traditional commercial banks. Table 3  Table 3  Table 3  Table 3 Emerging market proxy is being considered through Czech Republic (Table 4) . Czech Republic is often used in research as sample country for the level of its financial development and data quality (see Bezemer, Werner (2009) ). Regression results show that Bank Assets (credit proxy) is significantly correlated with the economy (GDP, house prices, equity markets to some extent). 
